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Minimal Model Explanations
Robert W. Batterman and Collin C. Rice*y
This article discusses minimal model explanations, which we argue are distinct from
various causal, mechanical, difference-making, and so on, strategies prominent in the phil-
osophical literature. We contend that what accounts for the explanatory power of these
models is not that they have certain features in common with real systems. Rather, the
models are explanatory because of a story about why a class of systems will all display the
same large-scale behavior because the details that distinguish them are irrelevant. This
story explains patterns across extremely diverse systems and shows how minimal models
can be used to understand real systems.
1. Introduction. Whatmakes a scientificmodel explanatory?This is a topic
that has received considerable attention of late in the philosophy of science
literature. It is intimately bound up with questions about the nature and role
of idealizations, about the role of mathematics in empirical investigations,
and about what counts as a scientific representation. In this article we argue
that there is a class of explanatory models whose explanatory structure has
been almost universally misunderstood by philosophers. These models are
used to explain patterns of macroscopic behavior across systems that are
heterogeneous at smaller scales.We call thesemodels “minimalmodels,” and
our goal is to provide some examples and an analysis of what actually does
the explanatory work when such models are employed. Perhaps the re-
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markable feature of minimal models is that they are thoroughgoing car-
icatures of real systems. This fact raises the following question: How can a
model that really looks nothing like any system it is supposed to “represent”
play a role in allowing us to understand and explain the behavior of that sys-
tem? We take the lack of similarity or representation quite seriously and argue
that the existing philosophical literature looks in the wrong place to try and
understand what makes these models explanatory, by only looking at the fea-
tures they have in common with real systems. Instead, we will show that an
explanatory story devoid of representation relations is required to understand
how these models can be used to such great effect. In many cases, considera-
tions of representational accuracy are inadequate to explain why so many di-
verse systems, including the model system, will display the same macroscale
behavior. It is only once we have a fundamentally different kind of story about
how these minimal models “latch onto the world” that we can see in virtue of
what they are able to explain universal patterns across diverse real systems.1
This alternative story also shows why those different/heterogeneous systems
can be modeled by such minimal models, why the heterogeneous systems
have certain very general features in common, and how those features are re-
lated to the macroscale behavior of those systems. We show how to provide
an explanation of patterns that are realized by diverse systems and also dem-
onstrate how a minimal model can be employed to understand the behavior
of real systems.
Let us explicitly lay out the main argument of the article:
1. Most philosophical accounts claim that a model explains just when it
has certain relevant features in common with actual systems and that
having these features in common is exactly what does the explaining.
2. There are several cases in which a model explains a universal pattern,
but simply citing those features the model has in common with real
systems misidentifies what makes it explanatory.
3. Therefore, these models must be explanatory in virtue of some other
connection with real-world systems.
We then argue that, in many cases, this alternative connection can only be
understood by moving beyond the features represented within the model
itself and by paying attention to a process of delimiting a universality class,
by demonstrating that the details that distinguish the model system and var-
ious real systems are irrelevant. In these minimal model explanations, the
key connection between the model and the diverse real-world systems is that
they are in the same universality class.
1. As we will see, this “latching” metaphor involves a connection that does not mention
accurate representation.
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In Section 2, we discuss a number of recent accounts of what makes
a model explanatory that, despite their differences, can be grouped under
the heading of “common features accounts.” These accounts all hold that
some kind of accurate mirroring, or mapping, or representation relation be-
tween model and target is responsible for the explanatory success of the
model. We then argue that these accounts fail to provide answers to several
explanatory questions that are essential for understanding patterns displayed
by distinct systems. Sections 3 and 4 present and analyze two examples of
the use of minimal models to provide explanations—one from fluid mechan-
ics and one from population biology. These examples are just two instances
of a large class of minimal model explanations in science. We detail the mod-
els and show how they can be explanatory despite an almost complete lack
of correspondence with any real fluid system or biological population.
2. Common Features Accounts. Many accounts of explanatory models
claim that a model is explanatory because it has certain relevant features in
common with the model’s target systemðsÞ. Indeed, several recent accounts
of explanation, idealization, and the role of mathematics in scientific expla-
nation involve claims to the effect that a model explains in virtue of “accu-
rately representing,” “mirroring,” or “mapping onto” the relevant features
of its target systemðsÞ. This section presents several of these accounts. We
believe that none of these can adequately account for the explanatory role
played by our examples of minimal models. These views may very well pro-
vide good reasons for why some models are explanatory, but as we argue
below, their focus on representation misses what is explanatory when mini-
mal models are employed. Our aim in this section is only to show that these
accounts are all reasonably grouped under the heading “common features ac-
counts” and that when applied to minimal models they will respond similarly
to the second of the following two questions.
1. What accuracy conditions are required for the model to explain?
2. In virtue of what does the model explain?
We think these questions are importantly different. However, we think most
philosophical accounts of explanatory models conflate them in the follow-
ing sense. They answer the second by citing that the accuracy conditions
noted in response to the first are met. Each account presented in this sec-
tion implies that a model explains in virtue of meeting some accuracy con-
ditions.2
2. Put differently, common features accounts claim that these accuracy conditions are
not only necessary but also sufficient to explain the phenomenon of interest.
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2.1. Mechanistic Models. Accuracy requirements are prominent in var-
ious accounts that claim that only mechanistic models explain ðCraver 2006;
Kaplan 2011; Kaplan and Craver 2011Þ. Mechanistic accounts typically place
extremely strict accuracy conditions on explanatory models by requiring that
the model accurately describe the actual causal mechanismðsÞ that produced
the phenomenon. For example, Kaplan’s and Craver’s model-mechanism-
mapping ð3MÞ requirement claims:
ð3MÞ A model of a target phenomenon explains that phenomenon to the
extent that ðaÞ the variables in the model correspond to identifiable com-
ponents, activities, and organizational features of the target mechanism
that produces, maintains, or underlies the phenomenon, and ðbÞ the ðper-
haps mathematicalÞ dependencies posited among these ðperhaps mathe-
maticalÞ variables in the model correspond to causal relations among the
components of the target mechanism. ðKaplan 2011, 347Þ
The 3M requirement involves various kinds of “correspondence” between
the model and the actual causal mechanisms that produced the explanan-
dum.3 Furthermore, on this account, a model explains simply in virtue of
having these corresponding features in common with the actual mecha-
nisms that produce the phenomenon. For example, Craver tells us that
ðhow-actuallyÞ models possess explanatory force because they describe
the “real components, activities, and organizational features of the mech-
anism that in fact produces the phenomenon” ð2006, 361Þ. Furthermore, as
Kaplan tells us, the 3M requirement aligns with the assumption “that the
more accurate and detailed the model is for a target system or phenome-
non the better it explains that phenomenon” ð2011, 347Þ. So not only does
veridical representation of the causal mechanism make a model explana-
tory, the more accurate and detailed that representation is, the more explan-
atory the model will be.
We think this view is mistaken for a number of reasons. First, it gives far
too much weight to the accuracy requirements for explanatory models.
Many models are explanatory even though they do not accurately describe
the actual causal mechanisms that produced the phenomenon ðCartwright
1983; Batterman 2002b, 2010; Woodward 2003; Rice 2012Þ. Second, this
view mistakenly implies that more accurate detail concerning mecha-
nisms is always better. However, there are several reasons why the expla-
nation provided by a model might be improved by removing various details
concerning causal mechanisms ðCartwright 1983; Batterman 2002b, 2009,
2010; Rice 2012, 2013Þ. For example, in many cases we want to explain
3. Unfortunately, the 3M requirement leaves unspecified the sense of correspondence
between a model and a natural system.
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patterns that range over systems whose mechanisms are extremely different.
In such cases, a model that accurately represented any particular mecha-
nism would fail to provide an adequate explanation.
2.2. Causal/Difference-Making Models. Another class of accounts of
explanatory models offers less strict accuracy requirements. Here we include
contemporary causal theories of explanation that allow an explanation to be
improved by removing irrelevant causal factors from the model ðSalmon
1984; Woodward 2003; Strevens 2004, 2009Þ. Still, these causal theories
maintain some version of the accuracy requirement in that they require an
explanatory model to accurately represent ðor describeÞ the relevant ðor
difference-makingÞ causes that produce the phenomenon to be explained.
As Michael Strevens asserts, “no causal account of explanation—certainly
not the kairetic account—allows nonveridical models to explain” ð2009,
320Þ. As with many causal accounts, for Strevens, in order to provide an ex-
planation the model must accurately represent causal relationships between
the features cited in the explanans and the explanandum. On Strevens’s ac-
count, a “standalone explanation of an event e is a causal model for e con-
taining only difference-makers for e” ð73Þ. What makes this explanation
causal is that “the derivation of e, mirrors a part of the causal process by
which e was produced” ð75Þ.
More generally, for causal accounts of explanation, in order for a model
to be explanatory it must provide an accurate representation of the relevant
causal relationships ðor causal processesÞwithin the model’s target systemðsÞ.
Typically, this is done by having the relationships in the model mirror, cor-
respond to, or map onto causal relationships in the target system. On these
accounts, the explanatory power of a model comes from its having these rel-
evant causes in common with the model’s target systemðsÞ.
These accounts of causal explanation have also led to various claims
about how idealized models can provide explanations ðElgin and Sober 2002;
Strevens 2004, 2009; Potochnik 2007;Weisberg 2007, 2013Þ. These accounts
of idealization allow for the misrepresentation of irrelevant causal factors by
the explanatory model. However, having the causally relevant features in
common with real systems continues to play the essential role in showing
how idealized models can be explanatory.4 On Michael Weisberg’s account,
“minimalist idealization is the practice of constructing and studying theo-
retical models that include only the core causal factors which gave rise to
4. It is notoriously unclear precisely what the representation relation—mapping, simi-
larity, or isomorphism—is between a model and a real system. Presumably, there are
many that are used in science. However, an advantage of our view is that it shows how a
model can be explanatory without having to determine the precise nature of the repre-
sentational relation.
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the phenomenon” ð2007, 642Þ.5 According to Weisberg, a minimalist model
“accurately captures the core causal factors” since “the key to explanation is
a special set of explanatorily privileged causal factors. Minimalist idealiza-
tion is what isolates these causes and thus plays a crucial role for explanation”
ð643–45Þ. Among others, Weisberg cites Strevens’s ð2009Þ account of ide-
alization as an example of minimalist idealization. Strevens explains his ac-
count of idealized models as follows: “The content of an idealized model,
then, can be divided into two parts. The first part contains the difference-
makers for the explanatory target. . . . The second part is all idealization; its
overt claims are false but its role is to point to parts of the actual world that
do not make a difference to the explanatory target. The overlap between an
idealized model and reality . . . is a stand-alone set of difference-makers for
the target” ð318Þ. In other words, these idealized models provide an explana-
tion by ðiÞ accurately representing ðor ‘overlapping’ withÞ the causal differ-
ence makers and ðiiÞ using idealizations to indicate those causal factors that
are irrelevant.More generally, idealizedmodels are explanatory just when they
share relevant causes with the real systemðsÞ and make idealizing assumptions
that misrepresent irrelevant causes.
Although these types of accounts provide an improvement over the 3M
view, we feel they suffer from two main problems. First, these accounts
require that all explanatory models provide an accurate description of the
causes of the explanandum. However, if one looks at the explanations ac-
tually offered by scientists it is often the case that one finds no appeal to
causes at all ðBatterman 2010; Huneman 2010; Pincock 2012; Rice 2012,
2013Þ.6 Instead, many model explanations appeal to structural, mathemati-
cal, topological, or some other noncausal features of the system. Second,
while these ðcausal/difference-makingÞ accounts allow idealized models to
explain, the only role idealizations play is to indicate what causes are irrel-
evant. Therefore, in some sense, the idealizations themselves do not play
any role in the actual explanation. The goal is to show that the idealizations
are in some sense harmless because they do not “get in the way” of the ac-
curate representation of the causes that are relevant ðElgin and Sober 2002Þ.
We think this fails to adequately capture the positive contributions that many
idealizations make within explanatory models. Indeed, as we argue below, a
5. Of course, multiple notions of difference making are used in the literature on causal
explanation. The details of what makes a factor a causal factor are not important for our
purposes here. The general idea is that there is a certain set of factors that are causally
relevant to the phenomenon to be explained and that, for causal accounts of explanation,
it is in virtue of accurately representing ðor describingÞ those causal factors that the
model explains.
6. Of course, much of science does aim to provide causal explanations. Our claim is only
that in addition to causal explanations there are many explanations in science that do not
aim to accurately represent ðor describeÞ causal relationships.
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positive role played by idealizations is in demonstrating ðor derivingÞ the fact
that various details are irrelevant, instead of just using them to isolate dif-
ference makers only after we know what is irrelevant. But perhaps more im-
portantly, we think these views mistakenly claim that the “real explanatory
work” in these cases is done by the veridical representation of difference-
making features within the model. In contrast, our discussion of minimal mod-
els in sections 3 and 4 is designed to show how highly idealized models can
play explanatory roles despite near complete representational failure. Further-
more, theminimal representational success in theseminimalmodels is not what
is responsible for the models’ abilities to explain.
2.3. Pincock’s Proposals. Finally, on our view, some of what Chris-
topher Pincock says in his recent book Mathematics and Scientific Repre-
sentation allows us to situate his views with the others under the common
features umbrella. For example, Pincock argues that “we can distinguish at
least three ways in which mathematics can contribute to the explanatory
power of a scientific explanation. . . . These are by ðiÞ tracking causes, ðiiÞ iso-
lating recurring features of a phenomenon, and ðiiiÞ connecting different phe-
nomena using mathematical analogies” ð2012, 208Þ. Items i and ii parallel the
claims made by the accounts of explanation and idealization we have been
discussing. Item iii says that mathematics can also play an explanatory role in
science by showing that the same mathematics can be employed to cover
different systems. This involves showing that the model and its various tar-
get systems have some mathematical structure in common. As an example,
Pincock notes that “with the linear harmonic oscillator there is nearly total
overlap between the mathematics intrinsic to the representation of the spring
and the pendulum” ð78Þ.
Pincock’s view is more flexible about what kinds of common features
can be counted as explanatory. However, on Pincock’s view, one can use
mathematics to track causes, to isolate recurring features of a phenomenon,
and to connect different phenomena using analogies, only if one has a spe-
cific understanding of how mathematics can be employed in scientific repre-
sentation. He calls his account of representation a “structuralist” account, and
it is of a kind with other mapping and mirroring accounts. On his view, the
content of a mathematical scientific representation is determined by answer-
ing the following three questions: “ð1Þ What mathematical entities and rela-
tions are in question? ð2Þ What concrete entities and relations are in ques-
tion? ð3Þ What structural relation must obtain between the two systems for
the representation to be correct?” ðPincock 2012, 27Þ. An answer to the third
question will be the specification of a mapping relation that meets certain ac-
curacy conditions ð28Þ.
In sum, Pincock’s account of how mathematics can contribute to sci-
entific explanation requires the prior specification of a mapping relation
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between the model and the model’s target systemðsÞ. Moreover, as with the
earlier accounts, Pincock’s view implies that these models are explanatory
in virtue of having the relevant causal, recurring features or intrinsic math-
ematical structure in common with real systems.
2.4. Summary. We have outlined a class of accounts of explanatory
modeling that we believe can fairly be grouped under the umbrella of
“common features accounts.” The ðminimalÞ requirements for an account
to fit in this class is that the models explain in virtue of meeting some
“accuracy” or “correctness” conditions. Our goal in the rest of the article is
to challenge the common features account of what makes a model explan-
atory. There are, we will show, classes of explanatory tasks in science for
which the question “what makes a model explanatory?” is not properly
answered by appeal to even minimal representational accuracy conditions.
More positively, our discussion shows how models can be explanatory even
when they fail to meet minimal accuracy conditions and why it is a mistake,
in these cases, to equate explanatory virtues with accurate representation.
In what follows we present two examples—two minimal models ðone
from physics and one from biologyÞ—that we believe are at odds with com-
mon features accounts. We offer a new account of what it is that makes these
models explanatory. And, most importantly, we discuss how such minimal
models can be used to understand real systems. As noted above, an impor-
tant feature of our account comes from distinguishing the following two
questions:
1. What accuracy conditions are required for the model to explain?
2. In virtue of what does the model explain?
Common features accounts conflate these two questions. They respond to
the second by citing accuracy conditions. We believe that a model can meet
certain extremely minimal accuracy conditions ðperhaps so minimal that
even common features accounts would not deem them terribly importantÞ
and be explanatory. What makes such models explanatory has nothing to
do with representational accuracy to any degree.7 Instead, the models are
explanatory in virtue of a there being a story about why large classes of
features are irrelevant to the explanandum phenomenon. A number of com-
mon features accounts clearly intend to accommodate minimal models, and
7. Our claim here is not that one kind of explanatory model corresponds, and the other
does not, but that in the case of minimal models the features that correspond are inade-
quate to explain why so many diverse systems, including the model system, will display
the same macroscale behavior. It is only once we have a fundamentally different kind of
story about how models “latch onto the world” that we can see in virtue of what these
models are explanatory.
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so we are not arguing that they have missed the fact that these models can be
explanatory. Rather, it is our contention that their proffered reasons ði.e.,
some type of mirroring or accurate representationÞ for taking minimal mod-
els to be explanatory are mistaken.
3. Modeling Fluid Mechanics. Anyone remotely tuned into the weather
knows that it is difficult indeed to predict and understand the various kinds
of behaviors that presumably are governed by the equations of fluid me-
chanics. These equations are the Navier-Stokes equations and a continuity
equation:
r
yv
yt
1 v rv
 
5 2rp 1 nr2v1 f ; ð1Þ
yr
yt
1r  rvð Þ5 0; ð2Þ
where v is the flow velocity, r is the density, p is the pressure, v is the viscos-
ity, and f is body force per unit volume.
Note that the quantities involved in the continuum Navier-Stokes equa-
tions make no reference whatsoever to the small-scale details of any fluid
they purport to describe. Note also that these equations are extremely safe
ðdespite this lack of attention to microscopic detailÞ. By “safety,” here we
mean that one can employ these equations quite successfully in engineer-
ing context such as pipeline construction, airplane and ship design, and so
on. This safety in conjunction with a virtual inattention to microscale detail
ðthe Navier-Stokes equations were formulated before any real evidence
of the existence of atoms and moleculesÞ is called “universality.” It is an
expression of the fact that many different systems ðcomposed of different
molecules, with different interactions, etc.Þ exhibit the same patterns of be-
havior at much higher scales.
Universality is a virtue that can be exploited to find special models with
which to explore, explain, and understand patterns of behaviors of fluids
at the macro or continuum scale. One searches for what Nigel Goldenfeld
calls a “minimal model” ð1992, 32–33Þ. These models, we want to argue,
challenge the common features account discussed above. We present a spe-
cific minimal model for fluid flow in the next section. After that, we address
the nature of the explanation it provides. But before getting to this, let us see
what Goldenfeld has to say about minimal models. “There are two diametri-
cally opposing views about the way models are used. The ‘traditional’ view-
point has been to construct a faithful representation of the physical system,
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including as many of the fine details as possible. . . . On the other hand, such
fine detail may actually not be needed to describe the particular phenomenon
in which one is interested. . . . ½A more ‘modern’ point of view, such as mod-
eling the BCS theory of superconductivity, recognizes that all of the micro-
scopic physics is subsumed into as few parameters, or phenomenological con-
stants, as possible” ð33Þ. In fact, in recognizing this “it is only important to
start with the correctminimalmodel, i.e. that model whichmost economically
caricatures the essential physics” ð33Þ.8
Our case of fluid dynamics is probably more familiar than the BCS the-
ory of superconductivity. But the lesson is the same. In the Navier-Stokes
equations, the viscosity v and the density r are the parameters or phenom-
enological constants that ðdeeplyÞ encode all of the relevant microphysics.
We should look for a minimal model from which we can explore patterns
of fluid behavior, while virtually ignoring any realistic details of any actual
fluid.9 Once we get an idea of how minimal models work, we argue that
such models do not comport well with common features accounts.
3.1. A Minimal Model for Fluid Flow: Lattice Gas Automaton. The
aim of the minimal model called a Lattice Gas Automaton ðLGAÞ is to un-
derstand the large-scale patterns witnessed in fluid flow. This remarkably
simple model does, in fact, recover a host of features observed in real fluids
at these large ðcontinuumÞ scales. We want to know how it can do this.
Consider a set of point particles confined to move on a hexagonal lattice.
Each particle can move in one of six directions, so we attach a vector to
each particle ðsee fig. 1Þ. The rules are as follows. Between 1 and 2 the par-
ticles move in the direction of their arrow to their nearest neighbor site. Then,
if the momentum at that site sums to zero, the particles undergo a collision
resulting in a jump of 60°, as shown in 3.
Now take many particles, many iterations of this update algorithm, and
perform some coarse-grained averaging to yield macroscopic fields like num-
ber and momentum densities. The result will accurately reproduce many of
the macroscopic features of fluid flow. In particular, it has been shown that
this model reproduces quite accurately the parabolic profile of momentum
8. One might think that Goldenfeld is simply expressing the widely recognized idea,
most famously expressed by Levins ð1966Þ, that there is a trade-off between different
modeling aims—specifically, between generality and realism. However, we do not think
this is the case. In the story to be told below about what makes a minimal model ex-
planatory, we start with a correct realistic theory that shows that small-scale features of
systems are irrelevant for upper-scale universal patterns that are also real patterns. There
is no trade-off of the sort Levins and others refer to. Thanks to any anonymous referee
for helping us notice and clarify this difference.
9. The point is that we need not be concerned with the question of whether the model
“gets the details right.”
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density that is characteristic of incompressible laminar flow through a pipe
ðKadanoff, McNamara, and Zanetti 1989Þ. Figure 2 gives some idea of how
well this model mimics qualitative features of fluid flow past obstacles.
The LGA is obviously a computational model. Suppose we are interested
in studying the behavior of a particular fluid such as water or gasoline as it
flows past a plate. We could try to use a computational model that follows
the actual trajectories of the molecules that make up the fluid, but it is clear
that we would not get very far. Such a model will be woefully inadequate
for the purposes of understanding the large-scale structures we are inter-
ested in. But we can use the LGA. The question of interest is as follows:
Why/how is the minimal model explanatory? What allows us to use it to
investigate and to understand the actual behavior of real fluids? It is nei-
ther like a continuum model nor like a molecular model. The points in the
LGA model are material points representing regions and not molecules.
Again, our main question: Why does it work?
Figure 1. Update algorithm for lattice gas. Source: Goldenfeld and Kadanoff ð1999Þ.
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Note that the equations of fluid flow ð1Þ and ð2Þ show how the velocity
of a fluid at one point in space affects the velocity of the fluid at other points
in space. Such an equation results from three fundamental features:
• Locality: A fluid contains many particles in motion, each of which is
influenced only by other particles in its immediate neighborhood.
• Conservation: The number of particles and the total momentum of
the fluid is conserved over time.
• Symmetry: A fluid is isotropic and rotationally invariant. ðGoldenfeld
and Kadanoff 1999, 87Þ
A common features account would presumably argue that the reason the
LGA works is because it shares locality, conservation, and symmetry with
the real fluid we are targeting. Some philosophers have extolled the virtues
of “minimalist” models along these lines.10 For Weisberg, a model is mini-
malist because it “accurately captures the core causal factors” and because it
isolates those factors that “make a difference to the occurrence and essential
character of the phenomenon in question” ð2013, 100–102Þ. For Weisberg,
in all cases of minimalist modeling, “the key to explanation is a special set of
explanatorily privileged causal factors” ð103Þ.
We think it stretches the imagination to think of locality, conservation, and
symmetry as causal factors that make a difference to the occurrence of cer-
tain patterns of fluid flow or of the fact that the momentum density profile
10. The term “minimalist” is Weisberg’s ð2013Þ. We use “minimal” in the sense em-
ployed by Goldenfeld ð1992Þ and Batterman ð2002aÞ. These are different senses.
Figure 2. Flow past a flat plate. Source: D’Humières and Lallemand ð1986Þ.
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in a pipe is parabolic. But, as we have seen with Pincock, common features
need not be causal. And there is a sense in which these common features
are clearly relevant. We would like to deny, however, that the explanatory
work done by the LGA follows, in any important sense, from these com-
mon features alone. The features not mentioned in the model ðor those that
have been idealized away somehowÞ will be the “features that are irrele-
vant.” The common features are to be the relevant ones. But in what respect
are they relevant?
Our suggestion is that these minimal common features are relevant in the
sense that they are necessary for the phenomenon of interest ðe.g., the par-
abolic momentum profile in a real fluid in a pipeÞ to occur. Furthermore,
we hold that this is different from the claim that it is in virtue of including
these common features that the model is explanatory. As we see it, we need
answers to the following three questions:
Q1. Why are these common features necessary for the phenomenon to
occur?
Q2. Why are the remaining heterogeneous details ðthose left out of or
misrepresented by the modelÞ irrelevant for the occurrence of the
phenomenon?
Q3. Why do very different fluids have features ðsuch as symmetryÞ in
common?
Common features accounts completely misdiagnose what makes these
models explanatory because they merely assert that the common features
are “relevant” and that others are not, without answering Q1, Q2, and Q3.
Moreover, simply citing the common features does not in the least say why
the LGA minimal model—a caricature of any real fluid—works to under-
stand the macroscopic behaviors of those real fluids. Indeed, those features
alone are certainly insufficient to explain the behaviors of real fluids. Sim-
ply to cite locality, conservation, and symmetry as being explanatorily rel-
evant actually raises the question of why those features are the common
features among fluids. And that is just to raise question Q3. In addition,
merely citing these common features fails to tell us why the other hetero-
geneous details of these systems are irrelevant to their overall behavior—
that is, we still need an answer to Q2. We believe we will have an account
of why the LGA minimal model is explanatory, when we have answers to
each of these three questions.
3.2. Universality and Minimal Models. Suppose we could determine
or delimit the class of systems exhibiting the continuum behaviors of fluids
from other systems that fail to manifest such behaviors. This would be to
delimit the universality class that accounts for the safety of using the Navier-
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Stokes equations in widely varying engineering contexts. This would be
to determine, in effect, the stability of these behaviors under changes in the
lower-scalemakeup of the systems.Wewould be able to show that one could
perturb the very microstructural details of water to those of gasoline, say,
without affecting the common behaviors they display at continuum scales.11
Suppose further that the LGA minimal model can be determined to be a
member of this class. This would mean that its microstructural details ðwhat-
ever they areÞ could also be morphed into that of water or gasoline without
changing the continuum scale behaviors. Were all this to be demonstrable, we
would then have an answer to why the minimal LGA model can be used to
model and explain the behavior of real fluids like water and gasoline: it is in
the same universality class. It will, therefore, yield the same continuum scale
behavior that any other system in that class will realize—including real fluids.
This talk of perturbation and morphing is deeply metaphorical. But it
reflects a kind of robustness or stability that one gets upon being able to
delimit the universality class. In fact, the delimitation of the universality
class can be made quite precise ðand nonmetaphoricalÞ using the math-
ematics of the renormalization group. The mathematical strategy is compli-
cated, but we think the gist can be made clear quite easily ðsee Goldenfeld
1992; Batterman 2000, 2002b, 2005, 2010; Kadanoff 2000 for discussionsÞ.
The idea is to construct a space of possible systems. This is an abstract
space in which each point might represent a real fluid, a possible fluid, a
solid, and so on. Then on this space one induces a transformation that has
the effect, essentially, of eliminating certain degrees of freedom by some
kind of averaging rule. Many expositions mention a technique called the
Kadanoff block spin transformation. The idea, briefly, is that if one has a
lattice of spins, one can replace a collection from within the lattice by an
average or block spin that captures, in some way, the interaction among
spins in the original system. By rescaling, one takes the original system to a
new ðpossibly nonactualÞ system/model in the space of systems that exhib-
its continuum scale behavior similar to the system one started with. This
provides a ðrenormalization groupÞ transformation on all systems in the
abstract space. By performing this operation repeatedly, one can answer
question Q2 because the transformation in effect eliminates details or de-
grees of freedom that are irrelevant. Next, one examines the topology of the
induced transformation on the abstract space and searches for fixed points
of the transformation. If t represents the transformation and p* is a fixed
point, we will have tðp*Þ5 p*. Those systems/models ðpoints in the spaceÞ
that flow to the same fixed point are in the same universality class—the
11. This is similar to notions of invariance proposed by Woodward ð2003Þ but of a
more generalized form as discussed in Rice ð2013Þ. It is not a case of invariance under
causal interventions.
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universality class is delimited.12 A derivative, or by-product, of this analysis
is the identification of the shared features of the class of systems. In this
case, the by-product is a realization that all the systems within the univer-
sality class share the common features locality, conservation, and symme-
try. Thus, we get an explanation of why these are the common features as a
by-product of the mathematical delimitation of the universality class. This
answers question Q3 and provides, given the answer to Q2, an answer to
Q1—why the common features are necessary for the phenomenon to occur.
Let us make the following important comparison: many explanations
focus on finding difference-making factors and implicitly assume that fac-
tors left out are irrelevant. In minimal model explanations this process is
reversed: one proceeds by showing that various factors are irrelevant. The
remaining features will then be the relevant ones.13
In figure 3, the lower collection represents systems in the universality
class delimited by the fact that these systems/models flowed to the same
fixed point, p*, under the appropriate ðrenormalization groupÞ transforma-
tion t in the upper abstract space. Note that another system/model, F1,
fails to flow to the fixed point p*, and so that system/model is not in the
universality class. Note also, and this is crucial, that the LGAmodel is in the
12. To put this another way: the universality class is the basin of attraction of the fixed
point.
13. Thanks to Jim Woodward for suggesting this way of putting the difference. But we
also want to emphasize that this is not meant to be a descriptive claim about what is
actually done when minimal models are employed. Rather, this is the story that shows us
in virtue of what these models are actually explanatory. Thus, common features model-
ers can surely employ these models and believe that they are explanatory. But saying
or believing that they are and understanding and being able to show why ðon their viewÞ
they are explanatory are different things.
Figure 3. Fixed point and universality class. Color version available as an online
enhancement.
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universality class. The point in the abstract space corresponding to the LGA
model does flow to the fixed point. This allows us to understand how such
a caricature can be used to explain the behavior of real systems—the re-
maining heterogeneous details are irrelevant.
3.3. Summary. This section presented a minimal model ðLGAÞ that
can be used to investigate the behaviors of fluids at everyday ðcontinuumÞ
length and timescales. We have argued that what accounts for the explan-
atory power of this model is not that it correctly mirrors, maps onto, or other-
wise accurately represents the real systems of interest. Instead, the model is
explanatory and can be employed to understand the behavior of real fluids
primarily because of a backstory about why various details that distinguish
fluids and fluid models from one another are essentially irrelevant. This de-
limits the universality class and guarantees a kind of robustness or stability of
the continuumbehaviors of interest under rather dramatic changes in the lower-
scale makeup of the various systems and models. The renormalization group
strategy, in delimiting the universality class, provides the relevant modal struc-
ture that makes the model explanatory: we can employ complete caricatures—
minimal models that look nothing like the actual systems—in explanatory
contexts because we have been able to demonstrate that these caricatures are
in the relevant universality class. As such, one might as well use those mini-
mal models for computational ease. The backstory guarantees that, with re-
spect to continuum scale behaviors, it will reproduce the behaviors of real sys-
tems.
In order ðwe hopeÞ to avoid confusion, consider the following two ques-
tions and answers:
A. Why does a fluid flowing in a pipe exhibit a parabolic momentum
profile? Answer: the particular fluid and the LGA model are in the
same universality class, and by analyzing the LGAwe can see that all
fluids within this universality class will exhibit this profile.
B. Why do the members of the universality class have locality, con-
servation, and symmetry in common? Answer: the delimitation of
the universality class by the renormalization group story ðfinding the
fixed point of the relevant transformationÞ accounts for this com-
monality.
Notice that despite the fact these two questions appear different, they are
answered in exactly the same way. Thus, to explain why fluids display the
continuum behaviors they do, we employ the very same ðfixed-pointÞ ex-
planation required for answering the other question; namely, why do the
fluids have the common features of locality, conservation, and symmetry?
Citing the common features ðas relevant difference makersÞ is in effect just
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to pose the question one is interested in answering. The real explanatory
work is done by showing why the various heterogeneous details of these
systems are irrelevant and, along the way, by demonstrating the relevance
of the common features. So, we feel that for the kind of ubiquitous explan-
atory tasks involving understanding how universal behavior is possible, the
common features account completely misses what is explanatory. It allows
ða version of Þ the explanandum to masquerade as the explanans.
4. Modeling Biological Populations. Parallel examples of using minimal
models to explain various phenomena can be found in biology. In a diverse
array of applications, models that are only caricatures of real populations
are employed to explain actual biological patterns that range over extremely
heterogeneous populations. In such cases, the systems whose behavior we
would like to explain typically have very few features in common. How-
ever, despite the extreme complexity and heterogeneity of biological sys-
tems, biological modelers have been extraordinarily successful at building
relatively simple mathematical models to explain the patterns we observe
in nature. Such biological models typically make no reference to the details
of particular populations whose behavior they purport to explain. Yet, de-
spite their lack of attention to such details, these models can be used to ex-
plain many of the patterns we observe across a diverse range of populations
ði.e., these models are extremely safeÞ. This is another instance of “univer-
sality,” and it can be exploited to find minimal models that can be used to
investigate, explain, and understand real biological systems. Indeed, many
biological modelers emphasize this kind of universality as a main reason for
using their mathematical modeling techniques. For example, Stephens and
Krebs note that “foraging theorists have tried to find general design princi-
ples that apply regardless of the mechanisms used to implement them. For
example, the elementary principles of a device for getting across a river—that
is, a bridge—apply regardless of whether the bridge in question is built of
rope, wood, concrete, or steel” ð1986, 10Þ. In short, there are some large-scale
patterns ðor macroscale behaviorsÞ that reoccur regardless of the particular
physical ormechanistic details of the biological system. In fact, inmany cases,
a few key parameters within a highly idealized mathematical model will en-
code all the relevant features of the population. As an example, below we
present R. A. Fisher’s model of the sex ratio in which all the relevant dynam-
ics are encoded in the substitution cost for producing male and female off-
spring. The various details that distinguish the biological populations whose
behavior Fisher wanted to explain ðe.g., differences in the mechanisms under-
lying these costsÞ are irrelevant. Such universal behavior across extremely het-
erogeneous systems is a primary target for biological theorizing. Fortunately,
in many cases this universality means that we can use minimal models to in-
vestigate, explain, and understand the behavior of real populations.
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4.1. Fisher’s Sex Ratio Model. As we have seen, the aim of a minimal
model is to understand the large-scale patterns we observe across systems
that are extremely diverse with respect to their smaller-scale details. One
such pattern is the widely observed 1:1 sex ratio in natural populations.
Fisher ð1930Þ provided a simple equilibrium model in order to explain this
biological pattern ðseeHamilton 1967;Maynard Smith 1979; Charnov 1982;
Sober 1983, 2000, for elaboration and discussionÞ. Although this example
has been widely discussed before, we think some of its important features
have been either ignored or misunderstood.
Fisher’s original argument is presented in the following passage:
In organisms of all kinds the young are launched upon their careers en-
dowed with a certain amount of biological capital derived from their par-
ents. . . . Let us consider the reproductive value of these offspring at the
moment when this parental expenditure on their behalf has just ceased. If
we consider the aggregate of an entire generation of such offspring it is
clear that the total reproductive value of the males in this group is exactly
equal to the total value of all the females, because each sex must supply
half the ancestry of all future generations of the species. From this it fol-
lows that the sex ratio will so adjust itself, under the influence of Natural
Selection, that the total parental expenditure incurred in respect of children
of each sex, shall be equal; for if this were not so and the total expendi-
ture incurred in producing males, for instance, were less than the total
expenditure incurred in producing females, then since the total reproduc-
tive value of the males is equal to that of the females, it would follow that
those parents, the innate tendencies of which caused them to producemales
in excess, would, for the same expenditure, produce a greater amount of
reproductive value; and in consequence would be the progenitors of a
larger fraction of future generations than would parents having a congeni-
tal bias towards the production of females. Selection would thus raise the
sex ratio until the expenditure upon males became equal to that upon fe-
males. ðFisher 1930, 142–43Þ
In Fisher’s model, the set of available strategies includes all the possible
points on a continuum from producing only male offspring to producing
only female offspring. In a later paper investigating the key assumptions
underlying Fisher’s argument, Hamilton ð1967Þ argues that the main idea
behind Fisher’s model is that if the population moves away from a 1:1 sex
ratio then there will be a fitness advantage favoring parents who overpro-
duce the minority. To see this, suppose that females are more numerous in
the population than males. Consequently, parents who overproduce males
will, on average, have more offspring contributing to future generations
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than those who overproduce females. Therefore, parents who overinvest in
the production of males tend to receive greater reproductive value for their
investment, and male births will become more common in the population.
However, as the population approaches a 1:1 ratio, this fitness advantage
fades away. The exact same reasoning applies if we assume that female
births are less common. Therefore, a 1:1 sex ratio—or, more precisely, equal
investment of resources in male and female offspring—is the stable equi-
librium state of the evolving population.
Fisher’s model relies on a key trade-off between the ability to produce
sons and daughters. This trade-off—which economists refer to as the sub-
stitution cost—tells us how many sons can be produced if one less daughter
is produced. In Fisher’s explanation of the 1:1 sex ratio, this substitution
cost is perfectly linear—males and females cost the same amount of re-
sources to produce, and so one fewer son means one more daughter and
vice versa. This is why his model predicts a 1:1 sex ratio. Indeed, the key to
deriving the 1:1 sex ratio is that natural selectionwill lead to equal investment
in males and females, and males and females cost the same amount of re-
sources to rear to reproductive age ðSober 1983Þ. However, equal invest-
ment of resources in male and female offspring will result in other sex ratios
if males and females cost different amounts of resources to produce. Indeed,
in a later investigation of Fisher’s argument, Charnov ð1982, 28–29Þ shows
that generalizing Fisher’s model leads to the conclusion that the equilibrium
sex ratio of a population, r, can be calculated using the following formula:
r5
CM
CM 1 CF
;
where CM is the average resource cost of one male offspring and CF is the
average resource cost of one female offspring. In other words, this substi-
tution cost is the dominant feature that is the key to understanding the phe-
nomenon Fisher wanted to explain. In fact, Fisher himself recognized that
differences in the comparative costs of rearing male and female offspring to
reproductive age would result in different sex ratios. As a result, he tried to
explain why the human sex ratio is skewed toward males at birth yet also
why males are less numerous by the end of the period of parental invest-
ment ðFisher 1930, 143Þ. Fisher explained these facts by noting that males
cost less to birth but have a higher mortality rate, and so they cost more on
average to raise to reproductive maturity. So identifying the commonality of
the linear substitution cost allows us ðiÞ to explain the 1:1 ratio across many
natural populations, but ðiiÞ by finding this fixed point we can also explain
the behavior of other systems near that fixed point—populations that devi-
ate slightly from the 1:1 sex ratio. Moreover, we see that Fisher understood
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the need to illustrate the relevance of the substitution cost to determining the
sex ratio in order to show why his argument could explain the 1:1 sex ratio.
As was the case in the LGA model, a few key parameters encode all the
relevant details of these systems.14 Moreover, as in the earlier example, we
believe that this common feature—the substitution cost—is necessary for
the phenomenon ð1:1 ratioÞ to occur. Of course, this makes the substitution
cost relevant for the phenomenon to occur. But, we claim, simply stating
that common features are relevant features is not sufficient to explain the
phenomenon. Indeed, several additional assumptions are operative. In other
words, the explanation provided by Fisher’s model is far more ðand far lessÞ
than the features it has in common with real populations. Indeed, it is only a
caricature of real populations.
While Fisher does not make most of these assumptions explicit, later
investigations by other authors ðincluding Hamilton, Charnov, Sober, and
Maynard SmithÞ have clarified some of the idealizing assumptions required
for Fisher’s derivation of the 1:1 sex ratio. First, the strategy set of Fisher’s
model does not accurately represent the set of strategies actually present
within any real system. In addition, Fisher’s optimization assumptions are
inaccurate when compared with the selection processes taking place in real
populations. While the comparative cost of producing male and female off-
spring is certainly important, this is only one thing that might influence the
survival and reproduction of organisms in a population. In fact, the optimi-
zation process described by the model does not accurately represent any ac-
tual process operating within the real populations whose behaviors we want
to explain. Moreover, as with many biological optimality models, Fisher’s
model misrepresents the way in which phenotypic strategies are inherited, by
assuming that no recombination occurs and that strategies are inherited per-
fectly by offspring. These idealizing assumptions are often referred to as
“asexual reproduction” or “asexual mating” since they avoid the many well-
known complications introduced by sexual mating. In addition, like many
biological models, Fisher’s model assumes that the population beingmodeled
is infinite ðor effectively infiniteÞ and that organisms within the population
mate randomly. These idealizing assumptions play an essential role in the
model’s derivation of why the optimal trait according to natural selection is
expected to evolve in the population. Therefore, these assumptions, like many
of the others, are vital to the explanation provided by Fisher’s model. Indeed,
without these additional assumptions, the features represented in Fisher’s
14. In fact, more generally, in sex ratio theory, “relatively simple models are often able
to predict patterns in empirical data extremely well” since in many cases the results
depend on “ðiÞ a simple and unavoidable trade-off . . . and ðiiÞ a small number of crucial
variables” ðWest, Reece, and Sheldon 2002, 117Þ.
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model are insufficient for deriving the target explanandum.15 However, these
additional assumptions entail that Fisher’s model drastically misrepresents
the dynamics of any real biological population.16 Indeed, Fisher’s model de-
scribes a selection process that does not ðand could notÞ occur in any real
system. Yet, despite its being only minimally accurate with respect to real
biological populations, it seems clear that Fisher’s model is explanatory ðSo-
ber 1983Þ. The important question is why/how the model is explanatory given
that it has so few features in common with the real-world systems whose
sex ratios it is intended to explain. As Seger and Stubblefield note, optimality
models such as Fisher’s are “intentionally caricatures whose purpose is to
gain some insight about howa small number of key variablesmight interact. To
the degree that we persuade ourselves that the model represents reality, and
that the modeled interactions are general, we have learned something poten-
tially important about how the world might actually work” ð1996, 108Þ.17
Given that these models are only caricatures of real biological popula-
tions, why and how can they be used to explain and understand the behavior
of real populations? Put differently, how can a model that fails to meet even
minimal accuracy requirements nonetheless provide a satisfactory expla-
nation? Citing the features the model has in common with real systems fails
to provide a satisfactory answer. Moreover, simply noting that those com-
mon features are relevant to the explanandum fails to tell us why those fea-
tures are common and relevant. The answer to these questions, we contend, is
that Fisher’s model is a minimal model within the same universality class as
the actual systems whose behavior it purports to explain. The key to under-
standing the explanatory power of the model is to look to the means by
which the universality class is delimited and to the demonstration that Fish-
er’s model is in that class.
4.2. Fisher’s Model as a Minimal Model. In order to see how such a
caricature can be used to explain real systems’ behaviors, we require a pro-
cess for discovering ðor demonstratingÞ why certain dominant features are
relevant and why the various heterogeneous features ignored or misrepre-
15. Even more idealizing assumptions are required in many game-theoretic explanations
of highly general biological patterns ðRice 2013; Rohwer and Rice 2013Þ.
16. One could argue that these idealizations are not assumptions of the model but that
the model simply leaves these features out ði.e., they are abstracted awayÞ. Either way,
the end result is a minimally accurate model that requires a detailed story about irrel-
evance to understand how the model can be used to explain real systems.
17. While we believe that Seger and Stubblefield have understood the importance of
minimal models, their claim about representation shows they have misdiagnosed what
makes such caricatures explanatory.
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sented by the minimal model are irrelevant. Citing the common features in
Fisher’s model is insufficient to provide the insight we seek. We still need
answers to the following three questions:
Q01. Why are these common features ðthe linear substitution costÞ neces-
sary for the phenomenon to occur?
Q02. Why are the remaining heterogeneous details ðthose left out of or
misrepresented by the modelÞ irrelevant for the occurrence of the
phenomenon?
Q03. Why do very different populations have these features in common?
In our view, we can use Fisher’s model to explain the 1:1 sex ratio because it
is in the same universality class as populations of real species. A common
feature of members of this class is the linear substitution cost. However,
simply telling us that Fisher’s model has this feature in common with real
systems does not explain why those systems exhibit that behavior. For one
thing, we want to understand why such diverse biological systems will all
have the same substitution cost—that is, we want to know why this feature
is a common feature ðQ03Þ. This requires that we delimit the class of sys-
tems that will exhibit a linear substitution cost. In this case, we need a story
about why a linear substitution cost will be found in such diverse systems
ðe.g., a story about how such a feature could be “multiply realizable”Þ. More-
over, given the extreme diversity of the systems within the class, in order to
answer this questionwe need a comprehensive story about why all the various
details that distinguish those systems from one another do not matter—that
is, we need an answer to Q02. Finally, by showing that all the other details
are irrelevant, we can see why only these common features are necessary for
the phenomenon to occur—that is, we can see why those features are the
relevant ones.
Suppose we could delimit the class of systems exhibiting a 1:1 sex ratio
from other systems that fail to display this macrobehavior. This would be to
delimit the universality class that can account for the safety of using mini-
mally accurate models, such as Fisher’s, to explain patterns across extremely
heterogeneous biological populations. This process would also demonstrate
the stability of the 1:1 sex ratio under various changes in the details of those
systems. We could then show that one could perturb the very details ðor
featuresÞ of, for example, a population of sheep into those of a population of
mule deer without affecting the stable 1:1 sex ratio they display. Suppose
further that Fisher’s minimal model can be determined to be a member of
this class—indeed, the model population will evolve a 1:1 sex ratio. This
would mean that its details and features ðwhatever they areÞ could also
be morphed into that of actual populations of sheep or mule deer without
changing the 1:1 sex ratio. If we could somehow show all this, we would
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then have an answer to why Fisher’s minimal model can be used to explain
and understand the behavior of real biological populations. The minimal
model can be used to explain real systems because it is in the same univer-
sality class. Moreover, delimiting this universality class is what will provide
the modal force to explain why such diverse populations will all exhibit the
same macroscale behavior.
In fact, the importance of the robustness or invariance involved in delim-
iting the universality class can be seen in various attempts by biological
modelers to show that, across a wide range of possible systems, the same
equilibrium behavior will result. There have been several attempts to dem-
onstrate the robustness of equilibrium behavior with respect to various genetic
assumptions. For example, Eshel and Feldman mathematically demonstrate
that “phenotypic changes, when determined by long-term genetic dynamics,
even with a multilocus genetic structure including recombination, tend to con-
verge in the long term and, with probability 1, to local optima” ð2001, 183Þ.
In other words, over the long term, the results of evolution by natural se-
lection tend to converge to the predictions made by optimality models re-
gardless of the kind of genetic system involved. These attempts to show
that equilibrium behavior will occur even when the genetic assumptions are
changed in various ways do important work within the explanatory context
of caricature models like Fisher’s. The key part of the explanation of this
pattern is in demonstrating that the 1:1 ratio is stable across changes in these
genetic assumptions. This information is key to explaining why we see the
phenomenon across such heterogeneous systems. Moreover, this robust-
ness allows us to see why we can use Fisher’s model to understand real
systems, even though the model is only minimally accurate with respect to
those systems.
Several of the other assumptions involved in Fisher’s model can be ðand
have beenÞ given similar analyses. For instance, optimality models, such as
Fisher’s, are frequently used to explain why a wide range of heterogeneous
systems have evolved the optimal strategy ðor evolutionarily stable strat-
egyÞ regardless of whether their assumptions veridically represent any pro-
cesses systems ðRice 2013Þ. Instead, a key part of the explanation involves
showing that such macrobehavior is stable across various changes in the
actual processes involved in the population’s evolution of that equilibrium
point. In addition, it is essential to the explanation that we can demonstrate
mathematically that the actual population size is irrelevant to the overall
behavior of the system above a certain threshold.
In short, there are a number of techniques for demonstrating that a large
class of details of particular systems is irrelevant to their macroscale be-
havior. This is an essential part of the process of delimiting the universality
class—by demonstrating that various details are irrelevant, we can also see
the class of systems that will display the behavior we are interested in
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explaining. In such a minimal model explanation, we begin with a space of
possible systems. As before, each point in this space represents a different
system. In this instance, some will represent real populations and some will
represent model populations.
These populations are distinguished by the types of organisms involved,
the various assumptions made about the evolutionary dynamics of the sys-
tem, the population size, and so on. For example, some of the populations
in this space might look like this ðsee fig. 4Þ:
P1. Sheep, linear substitution cost, infinite population, sexual repro-
duction . . .
P2. Sheep, linear substitution cost, finite population, asexual reproduc-
tion . . .18
P3. Mule deer, linear substitution cost, finite population, asexual re-
production . . .
P4. Fisher’s model population ðincluding infinite population, etc.Þ
P5.⋮. . .
In Fisher’s case, those systems whose equilibrium point is a 1:1 sex ratio
are in the same universality class. To delimit this class, we need to use var-
ious techniques for showing why the heterogeneous details of various mod-
els and real systems are irrelevant to their macrobehavior. Demonstrating
this stability will ultimately provide an answer to Q02: why are the heteroge-
neous details of these systems irrelevant? Indeed, the investigations outlined
above contribute to the project of ultimately delimiting this class, by showing
that various details of those systems are irrelevant. In particular, we see that
various details about inheritance, the optimization process, the population size,
and the particular mechanisms underlying the linear substitution cost are all
irrelevant to the evolution of a 1:1 sex ratio. In addition, a by-product of this
process will be finding a set of features the members of the universality class
have in common—namely, the linear substitution cost. As a result, we are
able to see why those features are common features despite the various dif-
ferences among these systems. That is, we will have an answer to Q03 just
when we can show why various heterogeneous systems will all display a lin-
ear substitution cost. In addition, by showing that all the systems in this uni-
versality class have those features, we can answer Q01: why are these common
features necessary for the phenomenon to occur? Consequently, we can also
explain why other systems that fail to have those features ðe.g., beesÞ will fail
to display the macroscale behavior. By showing that the other details of the
18. As noted above, the assumption of asexual reproduction entails that no recombi-
nation occurs and that strategies are inherited perfectly by offspring.
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system do not matter, we can see why the linear substitution cost is the key to
the ubiquity of the 1:1 sex ratio. As a result, the minimal model explanation
answers the three questions that illustrate the shortcomings of the common
features approach. By answering Q02 via the delimitation of the universality
class, we in turn get answers for Q01 and Q03. Finally, we also see that Fisher’s
minimally accurate model is within the universality class containing the real
systems whose behavior we want to explain. This allows us to understand
how such aminimally accurate model could be used to explain and understand
real systems. We not only answer the essential questions for explaining the
ubiquity of the 1:1 sex ratio ðeven in impossible systemsÞ, but we now under-
stand why we are able to use Fisher’s model to explain the patterns we observe
in real biological populations.
4.3. Summary. This section presented a minimal model for explaining
the ubiquity of the 1:1 sex ratio. However, Fisher’s model is just one case
among many—indeed, biological modelers frequently use minimally accu-
rate models to explain patterns across extremely heterogeneous systems. We
contend that what accounts for the explanatory power of many of these
caricature models is not that they accurately mirror, map, track, or other-
wise represent real systems. Instead, these minimal models are explanatory
because there is a detailed story about why the myriad details that distin-
guish a class of systems are irrelevant to their large-scale behavior. This
story demonstrates, rather than assumes, a kind of stability or robustness
of the large-scale behavior we want to explain under drastic changes in the
various details of the system.
Figure 4. Fixed point and universality class for populations. Color version avail-
able as an online enhancement.
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5. Conclusion. By way of concluding, we would like to stress one im-
portant aspect of explanatory minimal models that has been missed in the
literature and that, we believe, has led the common features accounts astray.
In the LGA model we wanted to explain various continuum behaviors ex-
hibited by different fluids. Common features accounts would likely cite the
fact that the different fluids have locality, conservation, and symmetry in
common as explanatorily relevant and maybe even as explanatorily suffi-
cient. However, as we emphasized in section 3.3, this is a mistake. The fact
that the different fluids all possess these common features is also some-
thing that requires explanation. The explanation of this fact is provided by
the renormalization group–like story that delimits the universality class by
demonstrating that the details that genuinely distinguish the fluids from
one another are irrelevant for the explanandum of interest. This shows both
why they all exhibit the same behavior and why they have the common
features locality, conservation, and symmetry.
In the context of Fisher’s model, the same thing holds true. The ex-
planandum is the common/universal 1:1 sex ratio observed in diverse pop-
ulations of species. Were we simply to cite the fact that all these popula-
tions have the common feature of linear substitution cost, we would fail to
explain this universal behavior. The reason for this is that we can equally
well ask why the populations of different species distinguished by different
mating strategies, and so on, all exhibit a linear substitution cost and why
they display the 1:1 sex ratio. The answer to both questions, again, involves
the delimitation of the universality class. This involves the demonstration
that the details that genuinely distinguish the different populations ðsexual
vs. asexual reproduction, etc.Þ are largely irrelevant for their displaying the
observed 1:1 sex ratio pattern.19
The conception of universality, and its explanation, was largely devel-
oped by condensed matter theorists interested in understanding the fact that
different fluids all display the same behavior near their so-called critical
points. Physicists, however, are not satisfied to explain this behavior by
citing the common features of symmetry and spatial dimension. Consider
the following passage from Michael Fisher:
The traditional approach of theoreticians, going back to the foundations
of quantum mechanics, is to run to Schrödinger’s equation when con-
fronted by a problem in atomic, molecular, or solid state physics! . . . The
modern attitude is, rather, that the task of the theorist is to understand
what is going on and to elucidate which are the crucial features of the
19. Again, a by-product of this shows why certain features—linear substitution cost—
are common to the populations and why those features are relevant for understanding the
shared macroscale behavior.
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problem. For instance, if it is asserted that the exponent ½b depends on
the dimensionality, d, and on the symmetry number, n, but on no other
factors, then the theorist’s job is to explain why this is so and subject to
what provisos. If one had a large enough computer to solve Schrödinger’s
equation and the answers came out that way, one would still have no
understanding of why this was the case! ð1983, 46–47Þ
Fisher, in this passage, asserts quite explicitly that citing the features the
different systems have in common is just to ask the very question we are
trying to answer. This is precisely where we need something like the mini-
mal model explanations presented above. They provide the deeper under-
standing we seek.
We have argued that there is a class of explanatory models that are ex-
planatory for reasons that have largely been ignored in the literature. These
reasons involve telling a story that is focused on demonstrating why details
do not matter. Unlike mechanist, causal, or difference-making accounts, this
story does not require minimally accurate mirroring of model and target
system.
We call these explanationsminimal model explanations and have given a
detailed account of two examples from physics and biology. Indeed, min-
imal model explanations are likely common in many scientific disciplines,
given that we are often interested in explaining macroscale patterns that
range over extremely diverse systems. In such instances, a minimal model
explanation will often provide the deeper understanding we are after. Fur-
thermore, the account provided here shows us why scientists are able to use
models that are only caricatures to explain the behavior of real systems.
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